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Notes
SKIING CLOSE TO THE EDGE OF TRADEMARK LAW: THE
ENFORCEABILITY OF GEOGRAPHICALLY DESCRIPTIVE
MARKS IN VAIL ASSOCIATES v. VEND-TEL-CO.
I. INTRODUCTION
The practice of using trademarks to indicate the source or origin of
products dates back thousands of years.' Within the past few decades,
however, the economic value of trademarks and other intellectual prop-
erty (IP) has sky-rocketed in comparison to traditional tangible assets.2
Given this unprecedented change, courts and legislators encounter diffi-
culty determining the appropriate level of legal protection to accord to
owners of IP.3 In the field of trademark law, courts must balance the need
to enforce the rights of trademark holders against the social and economic
need to foster competition and allow the free flow of information.4 The
legal enforceability of geographically descriptive marks is a controversial,
yet unheralded area of law where these competing interests clash.5
In Vail Associates v. Vend-Tel-Co.,6 these interests came to a head in an
important and timely trademark infringement case in the Tenth Circuit.
1. See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPE-
TITION § 5:1 (4th ed. 2009) (noting that humans began using symbols to brand
cattle in ancient Egypt, Romans used signboards in their marketplaces, and medie-
val sword makers used marks to identify their hand-crafted weapons).
2. See Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Value in Intellectual Prop-
erty, HARv. Bus. REv., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 54, 56 (asserting that intellectual property
assets, rather than tangible property, are now "principal wellsprings of shareholder
wealth and competitive advantage").
3. See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense,
108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697 (1999) (arguing that "[c]ourts seem to be replacing the
traditional rationale for trademark law with a conception of trademarks as prop-
erty rights, in which trademark 'owners' are given strong rights over the marks
without much regard for the social costs of such rights").
4. Compare William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269-70 (1987) (arguing that strong protec-
tion of trademarks reduces consumer search costs and encourages producers of
trademarked products to create strong reputations and maintain quality), with Ste-
phen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L.J. 759, 760 (1990) (arguing
that overly protective nature of federal trademark law prevents competitors from
entering markets and harms consumers).
5. See Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the First Amendment, 70 TENN.
L. REv. 1095, 1098-99 (2003) (arguing that descriptive marks, currently valid and
registrable under federal trademark law, should be eliminated from trademark
protection). A descriptive mark is a "word, name, or symbol used to indicate a
brand of product or service that also describes the qualities or characteristics of the
product or service sold under that mark." Id. at 1097.
6. 516 F.3d 853 (10th Cir. 2008).
(205)
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Vail Ski Resort, the largest ski resort in the United States and one of the
most famous in the world, sued a ski marketing company for its operation
of the vanity phone number "1-800-SKI-VAIL." 7 Vail Associates (VA)
owned the registered service mark "VAIL," while Vend-Tel-Co. (VTC)
owned the registered service mark "1-800-SKI-VAIL." 8 VA sued VTC for
service mark infringement in violation of the federal Lanham Act, claim-
ing that the phone number was likely to cause confusion among consum-
ers attempting to reach VA.9 The Tenth Circuit, in a 2-to-1 decision, held
that the marketing company's phone number did not infringe upon VA's
geographically descriptive mark.10
The Vail court's ruling sheds important light on the legal enforceabil-
ity of geographically descriptive marks. 1 With many well-known and fa-
mous marks including references to geographic location, this decision will
leave holders of these marks questioning the strength of the marks and
their enforceability in federal courts in the face of imitators and free rid-
ers.' 2 This Note discusses the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Vail in light of
evolving federal trademark law and contends that the decision threatens
7. See id. at 857 (describing appellant's claim). With over 5,000 acres of skiing
terrain in northern Colorado, Vail is the largest ski resort by area in the United
States. See Vail.com, Vail Mountain Stats, http://www.vail.com/mountain/ex
plore-mountain/stats-facts.aspx (last visited Jan. 4 2010) (describing ski terrain at
Vail Ski Resort). Vail is also considered one of the most popular and renowned ski
resorts in the world. See id. (describing Vail Ski Resort's international reputation).
8. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 857 (describing facts of case). This Note will use the
words "trademark" and "mark" to also encompass the "service mark," which applies
to marks identifying producers of services as opposed to goods. The Lanham Act,
the federal trademark statute, covers the registration and protection of both trade-
marks and service marks. See 15 U.S.C. § 1053 (2006); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar
Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 191 n.1 (1985) (explaining that Lanham Act "gener-
ally applies the same principles concerning registration and protection to both
trade and service marks"); Ramsey, supra note 5, at 1099 n.14 ("All Lanham Act
provisions governing trademarks are applicable to service marks.").
9. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 857 (describing appellant's service mark infringement
claim).
10. See id. at 873 (explaining that court would not "extend unwarranted ser-
vice mark protection to VA on what the record tells us is first and foremost a geo-
graphical term describing a ski destination in the Colorado Rockies").
11. See Andrew M. Gold, Gold on the Limited Protection Afforded Geographically
Descriptive Marks in Vail Associates, Inc. v. Vend-Tel-Co, Ltd., 2008 EMERGING ISSUES
2547 (discussing impact of Vail on use of geographically descriptive terms as
marks).
12. See id. (stating that, in light of Vail, clients using geographically descriptive
marks should be advised that "the scope of their protection will likely be very nar-
row, and it will be extremely difficult to stop others from using the geographically
descriptive portion of the mark unless the use directly competes with the original
mark"). Weakening legal protection for geographically descriptive marks is signifi-
cant given the prevalence of such marks. See Robert Brauneis & Roger E.
Schechter, Geographic Trademarks and the Protection of Competitor Communication, 96
TRADEMARK REP. 782, 804 (2006) (explaining reasons for prevalence of geographi-
cally descriptive marks, including that famous geographic terms are memorable
and enable consumers to more easily recall merchants' goods or services, and fur-
ther that well-known worldwide marks can "become standardized among people
206 [Vol. 55: p. 205
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the enforceability of valid geographically descriptive trademarks and ser-
vice marks.13 Further, this Note argues that the failure to enforce a fa-
mous mark, which is earned through years of accumulated goodwill,
successful marketing, and the continuation of a quality service, is a detri-
ment to future federal trademark protection. 14 Part 11 of this Note de-
scribes the basics of federal trademark law and trademark infringement
lawsuits, and discusses the controversial trademark doctrines at the heart
of the conflict in Vail 5 Part III provides the factual foundation in Vail
and outlines both the majority and dissenting analyses.' 6 Part IV critically
reviews the court's rationales, concluding that the dissenting opinion is
more persuasive because of the approaches of other federal circuits as well
as the purposes of trademark law.' 7 Further, Part IV considers the poten-
tial impact of the majority opinion on other areas of trademark law.' 8 Fi-
nally, Part V discusses the impact the Tenth Circuit's ruling will have on
the enforceability of trademarks in today's marketplace.' 9
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Lanham Act and Federal Trademark Law Basics
A mark is a word, symbol, or phrase used to identify a person's goods
or services in commerce and distinguish them from goods or services of
who speak many different languages, thus enabling merchants to build interna-
tionally memorable brands").
13. For a critique of the Vail ruling and the potential consequences for the
enforceability of geographically descriptive marks, see infra notes 115-79 and ac-
companying text.
14. For a discussion of how the Vail decision fits into broader debates on fed-
eral trademark protection, see infra notes 148-79 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of federal trademark law and the relevant legal doctrines
at play in trademark infringement lawsuits, see infra notes 20-60 and accompany-
ing text.
16. For an overview of the factual background in Vail and a synopsis of the
majority and dissenting opinions, see infra notes 61-114 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of the Vail majority's reasoning, a critical comparison be-
tween the approaches of the majority and the dissent, and a discussion of the Vail
decision in the context of the approaches of other federal circuits and the pur-
poses of trademark law, see infra notes 115-58 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of Vail's effect on trademark infringement claims involv-
ing websites and Internet domain names, see infra notes 159-69 and accompanying
text.
19. For a discussion of the potential impact of the Vail ruling on future trade-
mark infringement disputes, see infra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
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others.20 The Trademark Act of 1946,21 commonly known as the Lanham
Act, is the federal trademark statute that governs the registration and en-
forceability of marks. 22 In order to receive legal protection, a mark must
be "distinctive"-meaning it must act to identify the source of a particular
good or service. 23 To determine whether a disputed mark is enforceable,
most courts place the mark in one of five classic categories of distinctive-
ness: generic, descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful. 24 Terms found
to be generic do not receive trademark protection, whereas those marks
determined to be suggestive, arbitrary, or fanciful are all considered "in-
herently distinctive" and thus will always qualify for registration and
protection.2 5
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006) (defining "trademark" to include "any word,
name, symbol, or device ... used by a person ... to identify and distinguish his or
her goods, including a unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others
and to indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown"). The
Lanham Act defines a "service mark" as "any word, name, symbol, or device ...
used by a person ... to identify and distinguish the services of one person, includ-
ing a unique service, from the services of others and to indicate the source of the
services, even if that source is unknown." Id. A "mark" is defined to include "any
trademark, service mark, collective mark, or certification mark." Id.
21. Id. §§ 1051-1127.
22. See id. (encompassing federal statutory codification of Lanham Act). The
specific Lanham Act provisions governing registration and enforceability of marks
will be examined in detail throughout this Note. The Lanham Act's legislative
history provides an insight into the purposes of trademark protection:
The purpose underlying any trade-mark statute is twofold. One is to pro-
tect the public so it may be confident that, in purchasing a product bear-
ing a particular trade-mark which it favorably knows, it will get the
product which it asks for and wants to get. Secondly, where the owner of
a trade-mark has spent energy, time, and money in presenting to the pub-
lic the product, he [or she] is protected in his [or her] investment from
its misappropriation by pirates and cheats. This is the well-established
rule of law protecting both the public and the trade-mark owner.
S. REP. No. 79-1333, at 3 (1946), quoted in Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505
U.S. 763, 782 n.15 (1992).
23. See Suman Naresh, Incontestability and Rights in Descriptive Trademarks, 53 U.
CHI. L. REv. 953, 955 (1986) (describing distinctive mark as one that creates
mental association in minds of consumers, whereby they understand that all goods
carrying mark are connected with single source).
24. See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir.
1976) (explaining that five categories are arranged in ascending order to reflect
mark's eligibility for trademark status and degree of protection accorded); see also
Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (adopting Abercrombie's "classic formulation" of mark
distinctiveness).
25. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 768 (noting that suggestive, fanciful, and arbi-
trary marks are protected "because their intrinsic nature serves to identify a partic-
ular source of a product"); Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 198,
194 (1985) (explaining that generic marks constitute a common descriptive name,
and that generic terms "are not registrable, and a registered mark may be can-
celled at any time on the grounds that it has become generic") (citation omitted).
Fanciful marks are coined or made-up words "that have been invented or selected
for the sole purpose of functioning as a trademark." See 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 11:5 (defining fanciful marks). Examples of fanciful marks include "Kodak"
photo supplies and "Exxon" oil products. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Rakow, 739 F.
208
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In contrast, descriptive marks are not inherently distinctive because
they directly and immediately convey information about the product or
service to the consumer.2 6 Accordingly, descriptive marks may only be
registered and legally protected if they have acquired "secondary mean-
ing."27 Secondary meaning attaches when a mental association has been
created in the minds of consumers between the mark and the particular
source of the product.2 8 Further, the doctrine of incontestability will pro-
Supp. 116, 117 (W.D.N.Y. 1989) ("The Kodak trademark is perhaps one of the
strongest and most distinctive trademarks in this country, if not in the world."); 2
McCARTHY, supra, note 1, § 11:8 (listing "Kodak" and "Exxon" among examples of
fanciful marks). Arbitrary marks include common words in the language that have
nothing to do with the goods or services sold under the name. See 2 McCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 11:11 (describing arbitrary marks). Examples of arbitrary marks
include "Camel" cigarettes and "Saturn" cars. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara
Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 210 (2000) (citing "Camel" as example of arbitrary mark
for cigarettes); 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:13 (listing "Camel" and "Saturn"
among examples of arbitrary marks). Suggestive marks merely suggest some qual-
ity or characteristic of the goods, leaving it to the consumer to determine their
actual nature. See Ramsey, supra note 5, at 1109 (explaining that suggestive marks
"require the consumer to exercise some imagination, thought, or perception to
determine the type of product sold under that mark"). An example of a suggestive
mark is "Tide" laundry detergent. See Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 212 (noting that "Tide"
mark may "invoke positive connotations" in mind of laundry detergent
consumers).
26. See Ramsey, supra note 5, at 1097 (defining descriptive mark as "a word,
name, or symbol used to indicate a brand of product or service that also describes
the qualities or characteristics of the product or service sold under that mark"); see
also 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:16 (explaining that descriptive mark might
inform consumer of intended purpose, function, use, size, provider, class, nature,
or desirable characteristic of goods or services).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (stating that secondary meaning is acquired for
descriptive mark when mark "has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in
commerce"); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 171 (1995) (not-
ing that § 1052(f) "permits an ordinary word, normally used for a nontrademark
purpose (e.g., description), to act as a trademark where it has gained 'secondary
meaning"'); Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194 ("A 'merely descriptive' mark ... may be
registered only if the registrant shows that it has acquired secondary meaning, i.e.,
it 'has become distinctive of the applicant's goods in commerce.'" (quoting 15
U.S.C. § 1052(f))); see also Ramsey, supra note 5, at 1118 (explaining that even
though phrase "secondary meaning" does not appear in the Lanham Act, "courts
use 'secondary meaning' as a synonym for the phrase 'has become distinctive' in§ 1052(f) of the Act"). Therefore, the test for registration and protection of the
five categories of marks may be summarized as: "[t]he general rule regarding dis-
tinctiveness is clear: An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being pro-
tected if it either (1) is inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness
through secondary meaning." Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 769.
28. See 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:5 (explaining that mental association
in buyers' minds between mark and single source of product is prime element of
secondary meaning doctrine); Alan L. Durham, Trademarks and the Landscape of
Imagination, 79 TEMP. L. REv. 1181, 1186 (2006) (illustrating that secondary mean-
ing requires extensive use of descriptive term as brand over time, to create positive
mental association for consumers).
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vide additional protection to registered descriptive marks that have been
in use for five continuous years.2 9
As a subset of the troublesome descriptive mark category, geographi-
cally descriptive marks pose difficult questions for courts.3 0 These marks
require a showing of secondary meaning to be eligible for registration and
protection.3 1 Without acquiring secondary meaning-the consumer's for-
mation of a mental association between the mark and a specific product-
geographic terms merely refer to a location, and will not receive legal pro-
tection.3 2 Thus, the central tension geographically descriptive marks cre-
ate is the need for courts to protect strong marks that refer to a location or
place, weighed against the necessity for other producers in the same geo-
graphic area to use their own marks to inform consumers about their
products.3 3
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 1065 (stating that registered descriptive mark receives in-
contestable status when "such registered mark has been in continuous use for five
consecutive years subsequent to the date of such registration and is still in use in
commerce"); see also Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 205 (holding that once mark has be-
come incontestable, it may no longer be challenged as being "merely descriptive");
Naresh, supra note 23, at 973 (explaining that Lanham Act's incontestability provi-
sions cut off challenges to registered mark's distinctiveness after five years of con-
tinuous use).
30. See 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 14:10 (noting that once established re-
quirements are met, most courts will protect geographical terms in same way as any
strong mark, but some other courts have held that certain geographical marks are
inherently weak marks and therefore are only entitled to "narrow scope of protec-
tion"); Durham, supra note 28, at 1187-1212 (arguing that although geographic
associations are powerful and useful tools for product marketers, for courts analyz-
ing "geographic terms used as trademarks, achieving that equilibrium has proven
particularly difficult").
31. See 2 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 14:9 (explaining that geographic terms
must acquire secondary meaning for legal protection, and that owner of such mark
must prove that customers have come to use geographically descriptive word in
new and secondary sense as identifying only one source and quality of goods or
services); see also id. § 14:10 ("Once proof of secondary meaning is established, a
geographical term generally will be protected in the same manner as any other
'strong' mark.").
32. See id. § 14:1 (explaining that in absence of secondary meaning, geo-
graphic terms are not specific or distinctive enough to be eligible for registration
and protection because consumers associate mark with geographic place, rather
than mark holder's product).
33. See id. (describing "public domain" argument that every seller should have
right to inform customers of geographic origin of seller's goods, unless one mark
holder has built up enough goodwill and consumer recognition to qualify for legal
protection and to allow mark to be taken out of public domain); see also Brauneis &
Schechter, supra note 12, at 803 ("Granting trademark rights to a geographic term
makes it more difficult for a competitor who is located in the place designated by
the term to inform the public of its location."). The Restatement of Unfair Competi-
tion has characterized the conflicting interests between mark holders and competi-
tors in the following way:
That a watch is Swiss, that wine is from California, that maple syrup is
from Vermont, or that a dress has been designed in New York or Paris are
facts in which consumers are interested and which sellers therefore wish
to disclose in a prominent manner. While not all locales are of special
210 [Vol. 55: p. 205
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B. Trademark Infringement Suits in Federal Court:
Battleground of Competing Interests
The Lanham Act provides legal recourse for the owner of a mark who
believes another party is using an identical or confusingly similar mark,
thereby infringing the owner's rights. 34 Remedies available to the owner
for the infringement include injunctive relief (preventing the infringing
party from using the mark), damages, lost profits, and attorney's fees.3 5 In
an infringement suit, the plaintiff owner must prove that a valid mark ex-
ists and that the defendant's mark is likely to cause confusion among con-
importance to consumers, merchants should remain free to indicate the
location of their place of business or the geographic origin of their goods
without unnecessary risk of infringement.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 14 cmt. d (1995).
34. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114. Section 1114(1), the Lanham Act's trademark in-
fringement provision that applies to registered marks, provides:
(1) Any person who shall, without the consent of the registrant-
(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable
imitation of a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services on or in connec-
tion with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake,
or to deceive; or
(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a registered mark
and apply such reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation to
labels, signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements in-
tended to be used in commerce upon or in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services on or in
connection with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause
mistake, or to deceive, shall be liable in a civil action by the registrant for
the remedies hereinafter provided.
Id. § 1114(1) (a)-(b). Section 1125(a), the Lanham Act's unfair competition provi-
sion, which applies to unregistered marks, provides:
(a) Civil action:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading rep-
resentation of fact, which-
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to
the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the nature,
characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or another
person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in a civil
action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be dam-
aged by such act.
Id. § 1125(a)(1)(A)-(B).
35. See id. §§ 1114(2), 1117 (listing remedies available under Lanham Act).
2010] NorE 211
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sumers.3 6 Accordingly, "likelihood of confusion" is the key element of a
mark infringement claim.37
The Tenth Circuit has adopted a six-factor test to determine whether
a likelihood of confusion exists between two marks.38 Although different
courts weigh certain factors more heavily based on the specific facts of
each case, no one factor is determinative or controlling.39 The task of
balancing the multiple factors poses difficulty for courts because there is
no "precise formula" or "exact science" for judging consumer expectations
and mental associations. 40
The first factor analyzed in the Tenth Circuit's likelihood of confu-
sion test is the degree of visual and literal similarity between the disputed
marks.4 1 Next, the second factor examines the intent of the alleged in-
fringer in adopting a mark similar to the one already in use.42 The third
36. See A & H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198,
210 (3d Cir. 2000) ("To prove either form of Lanham Act violation, a plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) it has a valid and legally protectable mark; (2) it owns
the mark; and (3) the defendant's use of the mark to identify goods or services
causes a likelihood of confusion.") (citation omitted).
37. See 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a) (providing that holder of registered mark may
sue anyone who uses an imitation of his mark in commerce when "such use is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive"); KP Permanent Make-Up,
Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 117 (2004) (explaining that plain-
tiff must show that "defendant's actual practice is likely to produce confusion in
the minds of consumers about the origin of the goods or services in question")(citation omitted).
38. See Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002)(detailing likelihood of confusion test). The six factors for likelihood of confusion
are:
(1) the degree of similarity between the marks; (2) the intent of the al-
leged infringer in adopting its mark; (3) evidence of actual confusion;(4) similarity of products and manner of marketing; (5) the degree of
care likely to be exercised by purchasers; and (6) the strength or weak-
ness of the marks.
Id. (citation omitted); see also King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp.,
185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999) (adopting same six-factor test).
39. See Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v. AT&T Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1530 (10th Cir.
1994) ("This list is not exhaustive. All of the factors are interrelated and no one
factor is dispositive.") (citation omitted).
40. See Louis ALrMAN & MALLA POLLACK, 3 CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION, TRUSTS AND MONOPOLIES § 21:11 (4th ed. 2009) (asserting that "on one
hand, the court applies legal reasoning, and, on the other, abandons its legal ex-
pertise in an attempt to place itself in the shoes of a prospective purchaser").
41. See Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 972 (noting that degree of similarity between
two marks in question compares their relative "sight, sound, and meaning"); Uni-
versal Money, 22 F.3d at 1531 ("In evaluating similarity, we must not engage in 'side-
by-side' comparison. Rather, 'the court must determine whether the alleged in-
fringing mark will be confusing to the public when singly presented.'" (quoting
Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. (Beer Nuts I), 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th
Cir. 1983))).
42. See King of the Mountain, 185 F.3d at 1091 ("The proper focus under this
factor 'is whether defendant had the intent to derive benefit from the reputation
or goodwill of plaintiff.'" (quoting Jordache Enters., Inc. v. Hogg Wyld, Ltd., 828
F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987))); see also Beer Nuts I, 711 F.2d at 941 ("One who
8
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factor evaluates evidence of actual consumer confusion in the marketplace
caused by the two marks.43 Fourth, the court must consider the similari-
ties between the products or services carrying the marks and the parties'
respective manners of marketing.4 4 The fifth factor considers the relative
degree of care exercised by consumers when purchasing or searching for
products in the relative market.45 Finally, for the sixth factor, the court
must determine the level of distinctiveness and legal strength of the mark,
including applying the secondary meaning doctrine if the mark is deemed
descriptive. 4 6
Decisions from other federal circuit courts on the enforceability of
geographically descriptive marks have provided mixed guidance. 4 7 in ge-
ographically descriptive infringement cases, the outcome will often turn
on the court's determination of the mark's secondary meaning. 48 In Bos-
adopts a mark similar to one already established in the marketplace does so at his
peril... . All doubts must be resolved against him.") (citations omitted).
43. See Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 974 (noting that several Tenth Circuit deci-
sions have recognized that "actual confusion in the marketplace may be consid-
ered the best indication of likelihood of confusion"); King of the Mountain, 185 F.3d
at 1092 (adopting same language) (citation omitted); Universal Money, 22 F.3d at
1534 (noting significance of actual confusion in overall analysis). As an evidentiary
matter, however, a showing of actual confusion is not required to succeed in an
infringement claim. See ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 40, § 21:82 (explaining
that " [1]ikelihood of confusion can be established without any evidence of actual
confusion").
44. See Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 974 (explaining that when two products or
services are similar, and producers compete in same consumer market, there is
greater probability that consumers will be confused as to source and quality); Uni-
versal Money, 22 F.3d at 1532 ("The greater the similarity between the products ...
the greater the likelihood of confusion.") (citation omitted).
45. See Sally Beauty, 304 F.3d at 975 (explaining that consumer who exercises
higher degree of care in selecting product, measured at time of purchase, reduces
likelihood of confusion).
46. See id. ("The stronger the mark, the greater the likelihood that encroach-
ment on the mark will cause confusion.") (citation omitted). For determining the
strength of descriptive marks, secondary meaning will play a major role in the anal-
ysis. See Levi Strauss & Co., v. Blue Bell, Inc., 632 F.2d 817, 821 (9th Cir. 1980)
("Secondary meaning and likelihood of buyer confusion are separate but related
determinations. . . . The stronger the evidence of secondary meaning, the
stronger the mark, and the more likely is confusion.") (citation omitted). For a
discussion of the strength of the mark analysis and the judicially established five-
category spectrum, where fanciful marks are the strongest and generic marks are
the weakest, see supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
47. See Durham, supra note 28, at 1181 (arguing that courts have been at
times "sympathetic to the desire of marketers" to describe physical origin or loca-
tion of their products to gain advantage over competitors, and at other times
courts have enforced marks rooted in geography to prevent "unacceptable harm to
owners of the brand or to consumers").
48. See Boston Beer Co. v. Slesar Bros. Brewing Co., 9 F.3d 175, 181 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that "secondary meaning has been established in a geographically
descriptive mark where the mark no longer causes the public to associate the
goods with a particular place, but to associate the goods with a particular source")
(citation omitted).
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ton Beer Co. v. Slesar Brothers Brewing Co.,4 9 Boston Beer Company, the man-
ufacturer of Samuel Adams Boston Lager, sued Slesar Brothers Brewery
for its use of the mark "Boston Beer Works."50 In the First Circuit's analy-
sis, the deciding factor was whether secondary meaning existed for the
plaintiff's geographically descriptive marks "Boston Beer" and "Boston."5 1
The court found insufficient evidence to show that consumers associated
"Boston Beer" with anything other than a geographic location; therefore,
because the plaintiff failed to prove secondary meaning, the court found
no need to address the likelihood of confusion question.5 2
In contrast, in Resorts ofPinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst National Corp.,5 3 the
Fourth Circuit enforced the service mark of Pinehurst, a world-famous golf
resort, in a service mark infringement case. 54 Although Resorts of Pine-
hurst owned the federally registered mark "Pinehurst" for golf resort ser-
vices, the mark is also geographically descriptive because Pinehurst is the
name of a North Carolina town where the golf resort is located.5 5 Resorts
of Pinehurst sued the defendant for naming its two competing golf
courses "Pinehurst National Golf Club" and "Pinehurst Plantation."56
To determine whether the defendant's similarly named golf courses
infringed the geographically descriptive "Pinehurst" mark, the Fourth Cir-
49. 9 F.3d 175 (1st Cir. 1993).
50. See id. at 179-80 (explaining that Boston Beer Co. sued Slesar Brothers
Brewing for trademark infringement under Section 1125(a) instead of Section
1114 of Lanham Act because marks "Boston" and "Boston Beer" are not regis-
tered). Slesar Brothers used the marks "Boston Red" and "Boston Beer Works" in
its restaurant and brew pub in downtown Boston. See id. at 177 (describing facts of
case).
51. See id. at 181-82 (holding that Boston Beer Co. must prove that "when
read or heard by consumers in connection with beer, 'Boston' no longer means
that the beer was brewed in Boston or by a Boston-based brewer" but is produced
specifically by appellant's brewery); see also id. at 182 (holding that with respect to
mark "Boston Beer" as part of its name, "The Boston Beer Company . . . must
prove that a substantial portion of the consuming public associates those words
specifically with appellant's business") (citation omitted).
52. See id. at 183 (holding that appellant's consumer survey evidence did not
show secondary meaning, and because no trademark protection is given for geo-
graphically descriptive mark without secondary meaning, court does not need to
address likelihood of confusion question).
53. 148 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 1998).
54. See id. at 420 (noting that Pinehurst No. 2, one of eight golf courses at
resort, is "internationally famous" in world of golf).
55. See id. (explaining that golf resort and village community were built in
1890s, and then golf developer later named the area "Pinehurst"). Resorts of Pine-
hurst registered the service mark "Pinehurst" in 1990. See id. (describing facts of
case).
56. See id. at 422 (explaining that Resorts of Pinehurst sued for service mark
infringement, based on likelihood of confusion under §§ 1125(a) and 1114(1),
claiming that their mark was entitled to protection both under common law and as
federally registered mark); see also id. (emphasizing that "'[1]ikelihood of confu-
sion' is the basic test of both common law trademark infringement and federal
statutory infringement" (quoting 3 McCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1)).
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cuit focused heavily on the mark's strength and its secondary meaning.5 7
The court held that the mark had acquired secondary meaning, relying on
Resorts of Pinehurst's multi-million dollar marketing campaigns, survey ev-
idence indicating world-renowned acclaim for its golf courses, and the sev-
eral major professional golf tournaments held at its courses.5 8 The mark's
strong secondary meaning, combined with evidence of actual consumer
confusion, led the court to protect the "Pinehurst" mark by permanently
enjoining the defendant from using the mark in connection with its golf
courses.59 The Fourth Circuit's enforcement of a world-famous recrea-
tional service provider's geographically descriptive mark in Pinehurst pro-
vides an insightful contrast to the Tenth Circuit's approach in evaluating a
similar type of mark in Vail 60
III. THE TENTH CIRCUIT LOSES A GEOGRAPHICALLY DESCRIPTIVE MARK
IN A SNOW STORM OF TRADEMARK LAW IN VAIL
The federal courts' struggle to delineate clear guidance on the en-
forceability of geographically descriptive marks reached a peak in VaiL61
Vail Associates (VA), owner of Vail Ski Resort and the registered mark
"VAIL," sought to protect its service mark by suing Vend-Tel-Co. (VTC) for
infringement for operating the phone number "1-800-SKI-VAIL." 6 2 VA
57. See id. at 421 (explaining that Resorts of Pinehurst must first prove that its
mark is valid and protectable before it can succeed in trademark infringement
claim, and asserting that this determination will depend on whether mark has ac-
quired secondary meaning).
58. See id. at 421-22 (emphasizing importance of certain factors in secondary
meaning determination). Such factors include significant publication and market-
ing efforts by Resorts of Pinehurst, establishment of a famous reputation through
survey evidence, continuous and exclusive use of marks for several decades, nu-
merous books and articles written about Resorts of Pinehurst's golf courses (partic-
ularly Pinehurst No. 2 course), positive recognition in golf magazines, and
selection as a host course for major professional toumaments in the past. See id.
(noting evidence of strong secondary meaning).
59. See id. at 422 (noting that factors for consumer confusion included testi-
mony of employee of defendant's course stating that she answered phone calls
from people attempting to reach Resorts of Pinehurst to book tee times, and that
packages and shipments intended for Resorts of Pinehurst mistakenly were sent to
defendant's courses); see also id. at 423 (holding that defendant failed to confine its
use of disputed mark to merely inform public of geographic location, thus consti-
tuting infringement and providing grounds for permanent injunction).
60. See id. (holding that "Pinehurst" mark is strong and will be protected
against confusingly similar use by defendant golf courses). For a discussion of the
approach taken by the Tenth Circuit in the majority opinion in Vail, see infra notes
75-99 and accompanying text.
61. For a discussion of the evolving nature of trademark law and its applica-
tion by federal courts, see supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
62. See Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 2008)
(describing facts of case). VA's federal registration of its "VAIL" mark, registered
by its subsidiary company Vail Trademarks Inc., "encompasses 'downhill skiing fa-
cilities, ice skating facilities, cross-country ski trails and expeditions, hiking and
back-packing trails, and horseback riding,. . . resort hotel and restaurant services,
and retail store services in the field of recreational equipment.'" Id. (quoting U.S.
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brought three Lanham Act actions against VTC in the U.S. District Court
for the District of Colorado.6 3 The district court dismissed all three claims
in favor of VTC, finding that VTC did not infringe on the ski resort's mark
by using its vanity 1-800 number.6 4 The Tenth Circuit, under a clearly
erroneous standard of review, affirmed the district court's ruling and held
that VA failed to prove a likelihood of consumer confusion.6 5
The essence of VA's claim was that the geographically descriptive
term "Vail," combined with the verb "Ski" in VTC's phone number, consti-
tuted infringement of VA's "VAIL" mark. 66 Under VA's theory, VTC's
phone number was likely to cause consumers to mistakenly believe that
VA, or its ski resort, was the source of the number.67 As a result, consum-
ers were more likely to dial the 1-800 number when attempting to reach
VA's ski resort, causing wrongfully diverted business from VA to competi-
Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 1,521,276 (an. 17, 1989)). VTC's feder-
ally registered "1-800-SKI-VAIL" mark "offers 'marketing services related to the ski
industry, namely providing an automated phone switching system to offer services
available in or near Vail, Colorado and nearby resort locations."' Id. (quoting U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office, Reg. No. 2,458,894 (une 12, 2001)).
63. See id. (describing procedural posture of case). VA sued for service mark
infringement under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (a), alleging likelihood of confusion be-
tween the marks. See id. (emphasizing that infringement claim based on likelihood
of confusion is "factual inquiry upon which VA bore the burden of proof at trial").
For a discussion of likelihood of confusion, see supra notes 34-46 and accompany-
ing text. VA's second claim alleged that VTC violated § 1125(a) for "false designa-
tion of origin" in its use of the phone number. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 858 n.4 (noting
that district court had rejected VA's false designation of origin claim). For the
statutory text creating a false designation of origin claim, see supra note 34. VA
brought a third claim, under the Lanham Act's mark cancellation provision, ask-
ing the court to cancel VTC's service mark for two allegedly fraudulent misrepre-
sentations in VTC's registration application. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 858 n.4 (noting
that district court had rejected VA's cancellation claim); see also 15 U.S.C.§ 1064(3) (2006) (providing for cancellation of mark if "obtained fraudulently").
Both the district court and Tenth Circuit found little merit in VA's second and
third claims, and the Tenth Circuit devoted very little time to these claims in its
analysis. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 858 n.4 (holding that district court appropriately
rejected cancellation claim based on "scant record" of evidence provided by VA).
64. See id. at 857-58 & 858 n.4 (explaining that "the district court found VA
failed to prove VTC's use of its 1-800 service mark posed a likelihood of consumer
confusion between the services offered by VA and VTC," and that district court
also rejected VA's other two claims).
65. See id. at 873 (affirming district court's judgment). The Tenth Circuit
viewed all evidence "in a light most favorable to the district court's finding." Id. at
858 (citing Sanpete Water Conserv. Dist. v. Carbon Water Conserv. Dist., 226 F.3d
1170,1178 (10th Cir. 2000) (" [W]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the district court's ruling and must uphold any district court finding that is permis-
sible in light of the evidence.")). The court further stated: "On appeal from a
bench trial, we may not set aside the factual findings of the district court 'unless
clearly erroneous.' A court bound by the clearly erroneous standard cannot simply
reject findings with which it does not agree." Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a)).
66. See id. at 857 (explaining VA's theory of case).
67. See id. (describing claim of direct consumer confusion).
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tors offering ski vacations, ski packages, and lodging near Vail Ski
Resort.68
In support of its claim, VA introduced evidence that Vail Ski Resort,
owned by VA, is the only ski mountain in Vail, Colorado.6 9 VA exclusively
provides consumers with skiing facilities, although VA's expert witness ac-
knowledged that there were "hundreds of uses of the letters V-A-I-L in the
names of businesses in the Vail Valley."7 0 Nonetheless, a local travel
agent, who took calls from 1-800-SKI-VAIL in an agreement with VTC, tes-
tified that she received "ten to twenty calls" per week from callers who
asked about "the price of a season pass, . . . the weather, grooming, . . . ski
rental," and other general questions related to the ski resort.71
Turning to the legal status of the geographic mark, an expert witness
for VTC stated that in the specific context of ski resort services, the "VAIL"
mark "was very strong, probably world renowned."72 On the other hand,
the expert concluded that as a geographically descriptive mark, "Vail" is a
"weak term"-one that "members of the commercial public have a right to
68. See id. at 859 (describing facts of case). Vail Ski Resort, owned by VA,
provides skiers with exclusive access to the ski mountain and offers hotels, condo-
miniums, and other ski-related services. VTC, the owner of the number "1-800-
SKI-VAIL," used the number to route callers to a variety of businesses and travel
agencies. The purpose of the business is to use the number as a "conduit for
pointing consumers to ski-related services in Colorado, among other places" and
to connect consumers with travel agencies and ski lodging operations other than
the actual Vail Ski Resort. See id. at 859-62 (describing nature of each party's busi-
ness operations).
69. See id. at 861 ("Vail Pass was named in 1945 in honor of Charles Vail, a
Colorado state engineer. Seventeen years later in 1962, the Vail ski area opened.
The Town of Vail was incorporated in 1965. VA registered the word Vail in
1989.").
70. Id. at 859. VA's general counsel testified that local businesses such as "Vail
Sports, Vail Snow Board Supply, Vail Trail, Vail Mountain Lodge and Spa, and Ski
Club Vail" used the word "Vail" in their names with VA's permission. Id. at 863
n.6. The dissenting opinion also gave examples of local businesses, seemingly un-
related to the ski services industry, that used the word "Vail" in their names. See id.
at 884 n.1 1 (Tymkovich,J., dissenting) (noting that VA does not contest valid geo-
graphical uses of its mark by numerous businesses, including "Vail Limo," "Vail
Daily," "Vail Valley Music Festival," and "Vail Golf Club").
71. See id. at 859 (majority opinion) (describing testimony). A signed affidavit
by the travel agent stated:
When Vacation Coordination originally began answering calls to the 1-
800-SKI-VAIL telephone number some callers indicated that they were call-
ing Vail Mountain or Vail the place to ski. Some individuals would inquire
regarding the purchase of season ski passes, ski lift tickets, ski instruction
at Vail Mountain or Vail the place to ski.
Since December of 2001, callers have occasionally indicated that they were
attempting to reach Vail Mountain or Vail the place to ski.
Id. at 860.
72. See id. at 862 (recounting witness testimony). The expert was an attorney
practicing in trademark law and unfair competition and is an adjunct law profes-
sor. See id. at 861 (describing witness qualifications).
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use."7 3 After reviewing the trial evidence, the Tenth Circuit declared that
VA failed to prove likelihood of confusion because "the ordinary con-
sumer sees Vail as a place to ski, i.e., as a ski destination, without associating
it with any particular entity or service provider."74
A. The Majority Analysis: Leaving a Geographically Descriptive
Mark Out in the Cold
To arrive at its holding, the Vail majority applied the six-factor test for
likelihood of confusion, which was articulated in Sally Beauty Co. v.
Beautyco, Inc.75 The court first addressed the actual confusion factor, sin-
gling it out as the most important factor in its analysis. 76 Here, the court
focused heavily on the testimony of the travel agent who stated that only
"some callers" and "some individuals" might have been confused about
the source of the phone number.7 7 The court also rejected VA's argu-
ment that because consumers asked skiing-related questions when calling
the 1-800 number, the consumers intended to contact VA itself.7 8
In "the second most important" of the six factors, the strength of the
"VAIL" service mark, the court reasoned that it was not a strong mark and
therefore was not entitled to protection.7 9 The court acknowledged that
73. See id. at 862-63 (detailing expert testimony). The expert further testified
that VTC's use of the "VAIL" mark was "a reasonable, competitively necessary
thing" to inform consumers of the nature of its businesses. See id. at 862 (describ-
ing expert's conclusions). Finally, when asked if VTC had to use the word "Ski" as
part of its mark, the expert stated, "[w] ell, skiing is kind of what people do in Vail.
It is the main attraction. .. . I think skiing of course is a generic term in the area. I
mean, it's what one does. So it makes perfect sense to use it." Id. at 863.
74. See id. (holding that district court took permissible view of evidence in
finding no likelihood of confusion). The Tenth Circuit seemed to find the lack of
solid evidence presented by VA as its major flaw, rather than its infringement the-
ory in general. See id. ("As an appellate court, we are not empowered to disturb
[the district court's] view despite what we believe the evidence, properly gathered
and presented, might have shown.").
75. See id. at 863-73 (citing Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d
831, 833 (10th Cir. 2005)) (applying six non-exhaustive factors as test for likeli-
hood of confusion between two marks); see also Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc.,
304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002) (citing King of the Mountain Sports, Inc. v.
Chrysler Corp., 185 F.3d 1084, 1089-90 (10th Cir. 1999)) (listing six-factor test for
likelihood of confusion).
76. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 864 ("[E]vidence of actual confusion in the market-
place may be the best indication of likelihood of confusion." (quoting Sally Beauty
Co., 304 F.3d at 974)) (emphasis omitted).
77. See id. (asserting that "some" is vague and unspecific, and adopting rea-
soning from King of the Mountain Sports that proving probable confusion must go
beyond showing that "at someplace, at sometime, someone made a false identifica-
tion" (quoting King of the Mountain Sports, Inc., 185 F.3d at 1092)).
78. See id. at 865 ("That consumers phoning the number sought information
about skiing in Vail, Colorado tells us . . . . nothing about whether those same
consumers identified the name 'Vail' with the ski resort or the geographic
designation.").
79. See id. at 866 (finding that district did not clearly err in finding "VAIL"
mark not particularly strong).
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the "VAIL" mark had acquired secondary meaning and that it had at-
tained incontestable status.80 It also recognized that VA spent about three
million dollars per year marketing and promoting the Vail Resort and its
lodging facilities.8 1 These aspects were outweighed, however, by the lack
of actual confusion evidence, the geographically descriptive nature of the
mark, and the use of the word "Vail" by numerous businesses in the area.8 2
The majority opined that it might have agreed that "VAIL" was a strong
mark with secondary meaning, but VA failed to present enough evidence
of that at trial.8 3
Next, the court turned its attention to the third factor, the alleged
infringer's intent in adopting its mark.8 4 The court relied upon VTC's
president's testimony that neither his company nor any of his employees
intended to unfairly derive any benefit from VA's established reputation
or goodwill.8 5 The majority also rejected the dissent's assertion that the
court should "infer a wrongful intent" on VTC's part to capitalize on Vail
Resort's strong reputation.86 Thus, the court held that the phone number
trades on Vail only as a popular "geographic ski destination," rather than
trading on Vail as a mark identifying the actual owner of the ski mountain
and provider of the ski services.87
Proceeding to the next step in its analysis, the majority examined the
degree of similarity between the marks "VAIL" and "1-800-SKI-VAIL."8 8
The court focused on the lack of evidence indicating whether a typical
consumer would associate the word "Vail" with VA's specific ski resort,
thus reducing the chances that the number would cause confusion.8 9 In
80. See id. at 867 (explaining that secondary meaning and incontestability are
evidence of strength of mark, but are not determinative, without more, in likeli-
hood of confusion suit).
81. See id. (referencing testimony from VA marketing executive).
82. See id. at 867-68 (finding that "VAIL" mark is weak).
83. See id. at 867 ("VA and the dissent suggest the word 'Vail' 'conjures a
mental association with ski resort services in buyers' minds.' Perhaps so, but VA
did not prove it.") (citation omitted).
84. See id. at 868 (explaining that intent factor depends on whether VTC in-
tended to unfairly trade on VA's mark or deceive public into thinking that opera-
tor of Vail Ski Resort was associated with VTC's phone number).
85. See id. (noting that trial court was competent to determine credibility of
witness, and that appellate court is not free to reject district court's assessment
under clearly erroneous standard).
86. See id. (concluding that record did not show evidence of wrongful intent).
87. See id. at 869 (affirming district court's finding that VTC did not act with
wrongful intent).
88. See id. (explaining that test for similarity between two marks "turns upon
sight, sound, and meaning").
89. See id. (critiquing VA's argument that using word "Ski" in phone number
"brings to mind the very downhill skiing facilities for which Plaintiffs VAIL mark is
world renowned"). The majority reasoned that potential consumers who were un-
familiar with Vail Ski Resort or unaware of its reputation therefore could not be
confused about VA's mark for its specific ski mountain. See id. at 870 ("VA's posi-
tion, which the dissent readily accepts, presupposes two critical facts, neither of
which VA offered into evidence: (1) consumers calling 1-800-SKI-VAIL know that only
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another strong point of disagreement with the dissent, the majority re-
jected the notion that placing the word "Ski" before VA's "VAIL" mark
created similarity between the marks.90 The court also stressed the literal
and visual differences between the two marks.9 1 Finally, in one of its most
poignant statements, the majority rebuffed VA's entire claim by stating,
"VA essentially asks us to grant it a new service mark-'Ski Vail.'" 92
For the fifth factor in the likelihood of confusion test, the court con-
sidered the nature of the services VA and VTC provide and the two compa-
nies' respective means of marketing.9 3 The court found that instead of
competing with each other to sell ski-related services, VTC's phone num-
ber actually benefited VA by attracting consumers to the ski area.94 After
comparing VA's sophisticated, multi-million dollar marketing against the
"pauper" VTC and its "cost effective" strategies, the majority concluded
that consumers would not believe the marks emanated from the same bus-
iness source.9 5
Finally, in the sixth step of its analysis, the court weighed the likely
degree of care consumers would use in selecting the relevant services.96 It
reasoned that because ski vacations to Vail are expensive, both unsophisti-
cated and sophisticated consumers would exercise great care, and there-
fore would not be confused between VA's and VTC's services.9 7 Further,
the court rejected the argument that even sophisticated consumers famil-
iar with VA's ski resort would be initially confused by the phone number.9 8
one ski resort exists in Vail, and (2) those same consumers know the word Vail
means that ski resort.").
90. See id. (emphasizing that VA has no proprietary rights in generic term
"ski" and that VA could have sought service mark protection under Lanham Act
for entire phrase "Ski Vail," but did not).
91. See id. ("Needless to say, the word Vail is not a long distance telephone
number. VA's mark does not contain the word ski and contains no numbers or
hyphens.").
92. See id. (asserting that VA seeks overly broad mark protection).
93. See id. at 871 (explaining that nature of respective services and marketing
factor depends on extent to which parties compete with each other in consumer
markets).
94. See id. (concluding that VTC is not specifically in ski resort business, and
that its services are "at least one step removed" from VA's services and thus not in
direct competition).
95. See id. (noting stark difference in marketing budgets and methods of at-
tracting consumers between two businesses).
96. See id. at 872 (explaining that "[w] hen consumers exercise a high degree
of care in selecting services, the likelihood of confusion shrinks") (citation
omitted).
97. See id. (asserting that high cost of ski vacation forces both types of consum-
ers to exercise care in selecting service providers).
98. See id. (reasoning that more sophisticated consumers would not "phone 1-
800-SKI-VAIL at all" but "would be more apt to contact the Vail Resort directly").
Initial interest confusion, which acts to confuse consumers when they mistakenly
contact the wrong service provider based on a confusingly similar mark, is de-
scribed by the court: "Initial interest confusion is a 'bait and switch' tactic that
permits a competitor to lure consumers away from a service provider by passing off
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After reasoning that all of the factors for likelihood of confusion favored
VTC, the court held that the geographically descriptive "VAIL" mark is not
enforceable against VTC's "1-800-SKI-VAIL" phone number.9 9
B. The Dissenting Analysis: An Attempt to Plow Away the "Confusion"
At the outset, the dissent stated that it disagreed with the majority's
findings on each of the six factors for likelihood of confusion.10 0 Thus, the
dissenting opinion argued that VA should prevail because VTC's phone
number did infringe the ski resort's service mark.10 1 In his dissent, Judge
Tymkovich employed a "totality of the factors" analysis and characterized
VTC's use of the phone number as an attempt "to lure customers based on
the reputation of the Vail Resort for skiing."102 Accordingly, the dissent
strongly argued for enforcement of the geographically descriptive "VAIL"
mark. 103
The dissenting opinion first took issue with the majority's finding that
the two marks were not similar. 10 4 Judge Tymkovich reasoned that the
inclusion of the word "Ski" in VTC's vanity number "goes to the heart of
[VA]'s business" because "a consumer calling VTC can only have one
thing in mind: skiing at the Vail Resort."' 0 5 The dissent also criticized the
majority's reliance on the VTC president's testimony regarding his subjec-
tive intent in using the phone number.10 6
services as those of the provider, notwithstanding that the confusion is dispelled by
the time of sale." Id. (citing Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-
39 (10th Cir. 2006); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Co., 192 F.3d 633,
638 (7th Cir. 1999)).
99. See id. at 873 (holding that VA failed to prove likelihood of confusion
between its mark and VTC's vanity phone number).
100. See id. at 873-74 (Tymkovich,J., dissenting) (arguing that VA met its bur-
den of proving likelihood of confusion, even with narrow standard of review under
which Tenth Circuit must review district court's findings).
101. See id. at 874 (concluding that district court erred in its analysis of six
factors).
102. Id. at 883-84 (applying six-factor likelihood of confusion test and con-
cluding that VTC attempted to unfairly trade off of VA's ski resort reputation).
103. See id. at 883 (arguing that district court erred by "deeming the mark
weak simply because Vail is also a geographic location" and refusing to enforce it).
104. See id. at 874-75 (discussing similarity between marks factor).
105. See id. at 875 (reasoning that use of word "Ski" in specific context directly
links VTC's business in consumers' minds to Vail Ski Resort, rather than general
geographic area of Vail).
106. See id. at 876-77 (discussing intent of alleged infringer in adopting
mark). The dissent extended its analysis beyond the testimony of VTC's president
on the company's subjective intent in adopting its phone number mark, arguing
that "[b]y combining the terms 'ski' and 'Vail' in a phone number, VTC could
only have intended to evoke the particular skiing experience at the only ski resort
in Vail and named Vail." Id. at 877. Further, the dissent asserted that putting aside
subjective intent, VTC objectively competes with VA and is able to take advantage
of VA's international reputation and goodwill in the ski resort business. See id.
(discussing objective implications of trading on ski resort's reputation).
2010] NOTE 221
17
Jennings: Skiing Close to the Edge of Trademark Law: The Enforceability of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
222 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 55: p. 205
Further, the dissent argued that the district court and the majority
failed to properly interpret the travel agent's testimony regarding evi-
dence of actual consumer confusion.10 7 Judge Tymkovich reasoned that
the weekly callers who asked about ski passes, ski trail grooming, and ski
rental were attempting to reach Vail Ski Resort itself, as the most likely and
reliable source of this information. 08 According to the dissent's analysis,
when these callers reached VTC's marketing services instead of the ski re-
sort, VTC could divert consumers to VA's competitors in the Vail area for
hotel and ski accommodations.109 Therefore, because VTC was a direct
competitor for the same pool of customers-people seeking ski vacations
to Vail-it unfairly benefitted from any confusion caused by the
number.110
Finally, the dissent squarely addressed the issue of VA's mark as geo-
graphically descriptive when it analyzed the strength of the mark factor.11
It acknowledged that the strength of the "VAIL" mark turns on whether it
had acquired secondary meaning and established the requisite mental as-
sociation in consumers' minds. 1 12 In finding that "VAIL" was a strong
mark with authoritative secondary meaning, the dissent focused on the ski
resort's "world renowned" reputation, its repeated ranking as America's
best ski resort by a popular skiing publication, and its multi-million dollar
efforts to promote its reputation and build its brand. 11 3 The dissenting
107. See id. at 878-80 (noting that travel agent who answered VTC's number
received weekly calls regarding ski passes, ski trail grooming, and ski rental).
108. See id. at 879 ("People primarily seeking specific information about ski
conditions or tickets would naturally try to call the ski resort. This is what callers to
1-800-SKI-VAIL did.").
109. See id. at 879-80 (arguing that "initial interest confusion" caused by
phone number harmed VA because VTC routed callers seeking hotel and lodging
accommodations to VA's competitors, whereas VTC routed only questions about
ski conditions to ski resort). As further evidence of the impact of initial interest
confusion on both sophisticated and unsophisticated consumers, the dissent
points to the ease and care-free nature with which consumers would dial a 1-800
number in search of specific services. See id. at 882 (reasoning that once VTC had
diverted potential consumers of VA's hotel services to competitors, VA "will never
see those consumers who thought they were calling the resort" or those who
wanted to buy package of lift tickets and accommodations that only VA itself can
offer).
110. See id. at 881 (noting that VTC and VA compete in hotel and accommo-
dation market and emphasizing overlapping aspects of parties' services that attract
same consumer base).
111. See id. at 882-84 (discussing strength of mark factor and categories of
marks).
112. See id. at 882 (explaining significance of secondary meaning). In describ-
ing how a mental association could be formed in this case, the dissent stated that
"a consumer need not recognize that a particular company, or any company at all,
operates the ski runs at Vail; a consumer need only associate VAIL with that partic-
ular skiing experience." Id. at 883.
113. See id. (noting that VTC's own expert testified to resort's world renowned
reputation, Ski Magazine ranked Vail number one ski resort in thirteen of last sev-
enteen years, and VA's marketing efforts for its marks totaled $13 million in 2003
and over $100 million since 1989).
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opinion forcefully argued for the geographically descriptive mark's protec-
tion because not only had "VAIL" achieved prestigious status in the ski
resort context, but VTC's efforts to trade off of that established reputation
were unfair.114
IV. RESCUING GEOGRAPHICALLY DESCRIPTIVE MARKS FROM
THE LEGAL SNOW STORM IN VAIL
By refusing to enforce VA's mark in the face of the confusingly similar
and opportunistic use of a vanity phone number, the Tenth Circuit cast
doubt on the enforceability of all valid geographically descriptive
marks.' 1 5 The majority analyzed the likelihood of confusion-the touch-
stone of mark infringement lawsuits-through a narrow lens.' 1 6 This con-
trasted with the dissent's holistic "totality of the factors" approach, which
was more in tune with business realities and the mindset of a typical con-
sumer of ski vacations.' 1 7 The majority's approach is questionable in light
of Tenth Circuit precedent and the specific facts of the case, the ap-
proaches taken by other federal circuits, and the congressional and eco-
nomic purposes behind federal trademark protection. 18 Critically
114. See id. at 882 ("The mere fact that Vail is also a geographical location
does not prevent Vail Associates from creating a strong mark when 'Vail' is associ-
ated with skiing.").
115. See id. 873 (majority opinion) (declining protection for geographically
descriptive mark in ski resort context); Gold, supra note 11, at 2547 (stating that, in
light of Vail, clients using geographically descriptive marks should be advised that
"the scope of their protection will likely be very narrow, and it will be extremely
difficult to stop others from using the geographically descriptive portion of the
mark unless the use directly competes with the original mark").
116. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 863-72 (outlining reasoning on each of six factors for
likelihood of confusion). The likelihood of confusion analysis is the heart of a
trademark infringement suit, and the court's central focus should be on the rela-
tionship between consumers and their possible confusion between two similar
marks. See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 780 (1992) (Stevens,J., concurring) (identifying significance of likelihood of confusion test). For a dis-
cussion of the likelihood of confusion test, see supra notes 34-46 and accompany-
ing text.
117. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 882 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (framing six-factor
analysis on basis of "totality of factors"). A holistic approach allows the court to
remain focused on the overarching key inquiry of whether potential consumers
seeking the source of a product would be confused by encountering a competitor's
similar mark. See Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 780 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("'[T] he ulti-
mate test is whether the public is likely to be deceived or confused by the similarity
of the marks. . . . Whether we call the violation infringement, unfair competition
or false designation of origin, the test is identical-is there a 'likelihood of confu-
sion?'" (quoting New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of Cal., Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201 (9th
Cir. 1979))).
118. For a critical analysis of the decision in Vailgrounded in the specific facts
of the case as well as Tenth Circuit precedent, see infra notes 120-34 and accompa-
nying text. For a comparison between the majority's analysis in Vail and that of
other circuits, see infra notes 135-47 and accompanying text. Finally, for a discus-
sion of how the majority opinion in Vail fails to further the purposes underlying
trademark law, see infra notes 148-58 and accompanying text.
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assessing the Vail precedent is particularly important given its potential to
spill over into other areas of trademark law such as the commercial In-
ternet context. 9
A. Rethinking the Tenth Circuit's Likelihood of Confusion Analysis
Under Tenth Circuit precedent, the likelihood of confusion test must
be applied as a whole, and none of the six factors alone are determinative
of the outcome of an infringement suit.120 The majority in Vail, however,
gave significant weight to single factors favorable to its analysis, while over-
looking other equally important factors that might lean in the opposite
direction.12 1 For example, the majority paid the most attention to VA's
lack of evidence of actual consumer confusion.' 2 2 While this factor is im-
portant to the analysis, the plaintiff generally does not have to prove that
the marks caused confusion to any consumer in the past for the court to
ultimately find in its favor.' 2 3 Testimony revealed that callers had asked
specifically about ski passes and ski rentals, arguably showing that some
callers were in fact confused, in spite of the majority adamantly refusing to
recognize actual confusion.1 24
119. For a discussion of Vail's impact on trademark infringement claims stem-
ming from cyberspace, see infra notes 159-69 and accompanying text.
120. See Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833 (10th Cir.
2005) ("As with so many of our multi-factor tests, we have emphasized that this list
of factors is not exhaustive, that no single factor is dispositive, and that all factors
must be considered as an interrelated whole.") (citation omitted); Heartsprings,
Inc., v. Heartspring Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 554 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that final
consideration must be based on all relevant factors); Universal Money Ctrs., Inc. v.
AT&T Co., 22 F.3d 1527, 1530 (10th. Cir 1994) (emphasizing that six factors are
interrelated).
121. See Vai4 516 F.3d at 863-72 (describing six factors and relative impor-
tance of each to overall analysis). The majority focuses most of its attention on the
actual confusion and strength of the mark factors, while devoting significantly less
of its reasoning efforts to the remaining four factors. See id. at 863-68 (asserting
that first two factors are most significant).
122. See id. at 864 (noting that evidence of actual confusion may be best indi-
cation of overall likelihood of confusion).
123. See ALTMAN & POLLACK, supra note 40, § 21:82 ("Likelihood of confusion
can be established without any evidence of actual confusion. . .. [T]he required
proof is likelihood of confusion, not actual confusion."); 4 McCARTHY, supra note
1, § 23:3 (4th ed. 2009) ("Likelihood of confusion is synonymous with 'probable'
confusion-it is not sufficient if confusion is merely 'possible.'").
124. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 865 n.9 (asserting that dissent overstated importance
of callers asking ski-related questions). The travel agent who testified about the
calls, however, said that she would redirect those calls directly to Vail Ski Resort
because they would not generate revenue for her agency in terms of selling condo-
miniums and accommodations. See id. at 866 n.10. The dissent interprets this testi-
mony as proof that callers were seeking specific information about services that
only VA provides, thus confusing consumers even if they were not particularly
aware that VA owns the ski resort. See id. at 879 n.5 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting)
(noting that VA did not need to show that callers were trying to reach particular
company; instead VA must "demonstrate callers were trying to reach a particular
source of services"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 20
224
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Further, the Vail dissent posed a strong argument that, based on
Tenth Circuit precedent, the court could infer VTC's intent to trade on
the ski resort's reputation, rather than take VTC's word that no such in-
tent existed.125 The Vail majority was hesitant to question the unsavory
business motives VTC might have had in connecting VA's mark to skiing
within its phone number.1 26 Had the majority engaged in a more practi-
cal analysis, it could have recognized that VTC's strategic use of the phone
number to enter a ski services market where the "VAIL" mark already has
strong meaning differs sharply from the understandable and economically
productive use of the geographic term "Vail" by many local businesses.127
Such an analysis would acknowledge that rather than "ski" a geographic
location, consumers actually "ski" at facilities owned and operated to pro-
vide the skiing experience; thus, VTC used the verb "ski" to link its services
directly to the Vail Ski Resort.1 28 Those stores, newspapers, and other
businesses in the town of Vail that do not overlap with VA's core skiing
business should be distinguished from ski-related services-a commercial
market where the "VAIL" mark does deserve legal protection.129
Furthermore, regardless of whether VTC actually intended to confuse
consumers, the court should have further considered the potential con-
cmt. d. (1995) ("[T]he identity of the source or sponsor may remain anonymous.
It is universally recognized that a likelihood of confusion sufficient to establish
infringement may exist regardless of whether prospective purchasers know the spe-
cific identity of the trademark owner.").
125. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 877 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (arguing that by ad-
ding the word "ski" to VA's existing mark for Vail Ski Resort, VTC "could only have
intended to evoke the particular skiing experience at the only ski resort in Vail and
named Vail"); see also id. at 876 (stating that "court should infer intent from similar
marks" (citing Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. (Beer Nuts II), 805 F.2d
920, 928 (10th. Cir 1986))). In accordance with Tenth Circuit case law, a person
who knowingly adopts a mark similar to another mark already in use in the same
commercial context "does so at his peril" because "[aIll doubts must be resolved
against him." Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co. (Beer Nuts I), 711 F.2d 934,
941 (10th Cir. 1983) (describing Tenth Circuit's methodology).
126. See Vail 516 F.3d at 866-69 (relying on record of testimony by VTC's
president that VTC never intended to derive any benefit from VA's reputation or
goodwill). The majority interpreted the record to mean that VTC intended to
"trade on Vail as a geographic ski destination, rather than on Vail as a mark identify-
ing VA and/or its ski resort." Id. at 869.
127. See id. at 884 n.11 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (noting that numerous
businesses such as "Vail Limo," "Vail Daily," and "Vail Valley Golf Club" all incor-
porate geographically descriptive term into business names without infringing
VA's "VAIL" mark).
128. See id. at 879-82 (explaining how 1-800 number diverted business away
from Vail Ski Resort).
129. See Michael Fuller, Fair Use Trumps Likelihood of Confusion in Trademark
Law the Supreme Court Rules in KP Permanent v. Lasting Impression, 2006 B.C. IN-
TELL. PROP. & TECH. F. 011001 (2006), http://www.bc.edu/bc-org/avp/law/st
org/iptf/articles/content/2006011001.html (arguing that courts' "'c'est la vie' atti-
tude towards the complaints of descriptive mark owners" puts those businesses us-
ing descriptive marks at disadvantage, and that not protecting descriptive marks
goes against policies of federal trademark law).
21
Jennings: Skiing Close to the Edge of Trademark Law: The Enforceability of
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2010
VILIANOVA LAW REVIEW
sumers' general knowledge of skiing and ski resorts.1 30 Using a more
functional analysis, the dissent persuasively argued that for an experienced
skier, mentioning both Vail and skiing together would evoke the required
mental association for legal protection.13 1 Many potential consumers of
ski vacation resorts-the hypothetical basis for the likelihood of confusion
analysis-would presumably be familiar with Vail Ski Resort, as one of the
most famous ski mountains in the world.13 2
Finally, the factor that considers the similarity between the marks pro-
vides another example of the majority's overly formalistic approach to like-
lihood of confusion analysis.13 3 As the dissent reasoned, the numerical
prefix in VTC's mark does not change the overall meaning and impression
created for potential consumers when the act of skiing is linked to VA's
mark.134
B. Secondary Meaning Doctrine in Federal Court: A Tale of Two
Geographically Descriptive Marks
The majority's crucial finding that the "VAIL" mark was weak deviates
from existing law and practical analysis.' 3 5 The majority acknowledged
that "VAIL" had acquired secondary meaning, had achieved statutory in-
contestable status, and had a reputation for "world-class ski resort ser-
vices," yet these facts failed to satisfy the court.'3 6 A mark that a service
130. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 876 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that
VTC's intent to create confusion was directed toward consumers seeking ski vaca-
tions, and that court must use these "potential consumers" as standard for deter-
mining confusion).
131. See id. at 874 (asserting that district court erred by "ignoring the overall
meaning of VTC's mark for the consumer"); see also id. at 876 (noting that VTC's
expert witness who testified about strength of VA's mark admitted that he was not
a skier, had never visited Vail in winter, and was not aware of whether people could
ski in Vail, Colorado other than at VA's resort).
132. See id. (arguing that combination of "ski" and "Vail" creates "specific,
non-generic meaning" for consumers of ski vacations); see also 4 McCATHY supra
note 1, § 23:5 (explaining that "[a] potential customer is one who might some day
purchase this kind of product or service and pays attention to brands in that mar-
ket" and person with no knowledge or interest in market is not relevant for confu-
sion analysis).
133. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 869-70 (holding that marks "VAIL" and "1-800-SKI-
VAIL" are not similar based on sight, sound, and similarity test).
134. See id. at 874 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (emphasizing overall signifi-
cance of combination of words "Ski" and "Vail" for potential consumers of ski
vacations).
135. See id. at 866 (majority opinion) (holding that "VAIL" mark is not partic-
ularly strong). One commentator quipped that the Tenth Circuit's ruling offered
only a "'Vail' of protection" for VA's registered mark and argued that the Vail
court effectively held that a geographically descriptive mark is inherently not dis-
tinctive. See Daniel J. Sherwinter, Top Intellectual Property Cases of 2008, 38 COLo.
LAw. 49, 49 (2009) (discussing Vail case).
136. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 866 (noting that "VAIL" has secondary meaning, has
established a world-class reputation, and has reached incontestable status); see also
15 U.S.C. § 1065 (2006) (describing rights for owners of incontestable marks). For
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provider has used for four decades to build its brand into one of the most
famous in the world for that specific market segment makes a significantly
good case to be deemed a strong mark, and furthers the exact purpose
that secondary meaning serves.' 3 7 Although the town's economic viability
primarily depends on the ski resort, the court was unwilling to enforce the
legal rights flowing from trademark law that allowed the resort to build its
strong name brand.138
The Fourth Circuit's approach in Pinehurst, another case concerning
the geographically descriptive mark of a "world famous" recreational
sports service provider, better implements the secondary meaning doc-
trine.' 3 9 Relying on considerable evidence, similar to that presented in
Vail, the Fourth Circuit found "Pinehurst" to be a strong mark despite its
geographically descriptive nature.140 In particular, the evidence of actual
confusion in Vail and Pinehurst involves strikingly similar sporting contexts:
In Vail, callers to the 1-800 number inquired about ski passes, trail groom-
ing, and ski rental, and in Pinehurst, callers mistakenly called the defen-
dant's phone number when attempting to book tee times at Resorts of
Pinehurst's golf course. 14 1
a discussion of how incontestability cuts off challenges to the distinctiveness of
descriptive marks, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
137. See Daniel I. Schloss, Marks of Distinction: Rethinking Secondary Meaning
Standards in Trademark Law After Qualitex v. Jacobson, 14 CAR.Dozo ARTs & Er.
L.J. 695, 704 (1996) ("When confronted with any disputed mark, courts evaluating
proof of secondary meaning must essentially decide what the mark means to the
relevant sector of the purchasing public."). For a persuasive account of the evi-
dence VA provided to show that its mark creates a mental association for ski con-
sumers with the particular source of skiing in Vail, see Vail, 516 F.3d at 883
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (describing evidence of strong reputation and con-
sumer recognition).
138. SeeJoanne Kelley, Ski Town Residents Living on Slippery Slope in Tough Econ-
omy, RoCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 16, 2009, available at http://www.rockymountain
news.com/news/2009/feb/ 1 6/coloradans-flock-slopes-jobs.html (noting that busi-
ness and commerce in Vail and other Colorado ski towns depends on success of
local ski resort).
139. See Resorts of Pinehurst, Inc. v. Pinehurst Nat'l Corp., 148 F.3d 417, 422
(4th Cir. 1998) (holding that geographically descriptive mark "Pinehurst" has ac-
quired secondary meaning and is strong mark in context of golf resort services).
Resorts of Pinehurst owns the service mark "Pinehurst" for its golf resort, however,
Pinehurst is also the name of the town in North Carolina where the resort is lo-
cated. See id. at 420. For a discussion of the facts in Pinehurst and the Fourth
Circuit's analysis, see supra notes 53-60 and accompanying text.
140. Compare Pinehurst, 148 F.3d at 421-22 (holding that "Pinehurst" mark was
strong, based on combination of expert testimony that golf resort is "world fa-
mous," Resorts of Pinehurst's extensive marketing campaigns, and recognition as
one of country's best golf courses in leading golf publications), with Vail, 516 F.3d
at 866-68 (holding that "VAIL" mark was not strong, after being presented with
evidence that ski resort is "world famous," VA spent $13 million in one year mar-
keting its resort, and ski resort has been recognized by skiing publication as best in
country).
141. See Pinehurst, 148 F.3d at 422 (describing testimony of receptionist who
received calls from people mistakenly attempting to make tee times at plaintiffs
courses); see also Vail, 516 F.3d at 865 (describing testimony of VTC's travel agent
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Beyond the evidentiary similarities, the Pinehurst court displayed less
steadfast reluctance to enforcing the geographically descriptive mark of a
famous service provider than the Vail court. 14 2 The ski town of Vail ex-
panded in congruence with the ski mountain and now prospers in re-
sponse to the increased tourism generated by Vail Ski Resort.14 3 Likewise,
the golf village of Pinehurst grew alongside with Resorts of Pinehurst's golf
courses and enjoys similar resulting economic rewards. 144 This relation-
ship between luxury recreational service provider and geographic area is
symbiotic, providing mutual benefits. 145 As demonstrated by the Pinehurst
analysis, the goodwill created by the economic driver of this relationship
would be protected under trademark doctrine when appropriate. 146 The
Fourth Circuit recognized that strong secondary meaning was the vehicle
for legal protection of a valid geographically descriptive mark-an ap-
proach that sharply contrasts with the scant attention the Tenth Circuit
gave to the secondary meaning of the "VAIL" mark. 147
who received calls and the re-routed them to VA from people who asked about
season passes, grooming, and ski rentals).
142. See Pinehurst, 148 F.3d at 421-24 (holding that "Pinehurst" golf resort
mark is protectable and enforceable, even when Pinehurst is geographic name of
town in North Carolina that is also home to dozens of other golf courses not
owned by Resorts of Pinehurst).
143. See Bill Pennington, Ski Guide: Vail Ski Resort, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2008, avail-
able at http://travel.nytimes.com/2008/03/21/travel/escapes/00vail.html ("Call-
ing Vail a ski resort is like calling Paris a city in France. Vail is not only the biggest
and the most popular snow sports destination in the United States, it is an Ameri-
can institution, a beacon at the cultural nexus of sport, winter family travel and
high society.").
144. See Pinehurst, 148 F.3d at 420 (recounting golf course's and town's devel-
opment). Pinehurst was the United States' first golf resort, founded in 1895, and is
considered one of the two or three "homes of American golf." See Pinehurst: The
Home of American Golf Since 1895, http://www.sandhillsnc.com/pinehurst.html
(last visited Jan. 20, 2010) (describing history of Pinehurst golf resort). Pinehurst
has been named the best golf resort in the United States three times by Travel +
Leisure Golf Magazine. See Our Story, http://www.pinehurst.com/nc-luxury-hotel-
story.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2010) (describing growth of Pinehurst golf resort
and its recognition as one of America's top resorts).
145. See Pinehurst, 148 F.3d at 421 (describing relationship between geograph-
ically descriptive mark and particular source).
146. See id. at 420-21 (noting that Pinehurst golf resort had been connected to
the Pinehurst village for nearly one hundred years, and holding that descriptive
"Pinehurst" mark came to signify particular source of golf services, rather than
general geographic location). But see KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Im-
pression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, 122 (2004) (holding that some confusion by consum-
ers will be tolerated to prevent mark holder from grabbing monopoly over
descriptive term by denying competitors "the ordinary utility of descriptive
words").
147. See Pinehurst, 148 F.3d at 422 (finding strong secondary meaning for
Pinehurst resort).
228
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C. Geographic Marks and Economic Competition
Interestingly, the Vail court's reluctance to enforce a geographically
descriptive mark seemed to be an effort to promote competition among
businesses in Vail, Colorado. 148 In this vein, the majority convincingly
paints VA's infringement suit as an effort to squelch competition.14 9 Yet,
this reasoning fails to acknowledge that many businesses legitimately rely-
ing on the town's name to attract customers are not connected to owner-
ship of the town's single, exclusive ski resort.1 5 0 Conversely, when a
business in Vail directly competes with the sole ski resort in the ski services
market, customers and income are unfairly diverted to competitors who
trade off of the well-known mark.1 5 ' Therefore, when VTC attempted to
divert potential consumers from VA's hotel and lodging services to its own
clients, the court should have provided relief from this economic injury by
enforcing VA's incontestable mark.'5 2 Such a result better follows Tenth
Circuit case law addressing competition for goods and services and the
effect these producers' marks have on the mental impressions of consum-
ers.155 Despite the majority's purported efforts to promote competition,
its holding does more damage to the legal doctrines of incontestability
and secondary meaning-the purposes of which are to protect economi-
cally valuable descriptive marks.1 5 4
148. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 873 (asserting that legally protecting "VAIL" service
mark would "imperil the countless number of retailers, merchants, and innkeep-
ers" in Vail who must use town's name to promote their businesses).
149. See id. (reasoning that VA's lack of evidence of likelihood of confusion
shows that VA's purpose for bringing suit was to stifle competition). The court
candidly stated its view of VA's suit:
In the end, VA's lack of evidence suggesting a likelihood of confusion
could lead one to suspect VA's concern is really about "disconnecting" an
alphanumeric phone line which provides easy access to VA's actual ser-
vice competitors. The record evidence simply belies any notion that VA's
Lanham Act claim is about the likelihood of confusion. Rather VA's
claim appears more about limiting access to its competition by squelching
a conduit which provides easy, free, and readily available access to that
competition through use of a vanity or alphanumeric phone number.
Id.
150. For examples of many local businesses that use the "Vail" term merely to
reference the town's geographic location in connection with their services, as well
as ski-related businesses that use their marks with VA's permission, see supra note
70 and accompanying text.
151. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 878-80 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (discussing
wrongly received calls regarding ski passes, ski trail grooming, and ski rental for
Vail resort).
152. See Fuller, supra note 129 (arguing that courts should not broadly allow
fair use defense by competitor when original descriptive mark is incontestable, has
secondary meaning, and is otherwise strong mark in commercial context).
153. See Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 833-34 (10th
Cir. 2005) (noting that federal trademark law provides protection against use of
mark on both goods that are competing and those that are non-competing but
"related" goods in the minds of consumers).
154. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 873 (asserting that "[i]f some confusion exists, such
is the risk VA accepted when it decided to identify its services with a single word that
2292010] NOTE
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Indeed, enforcing VA's service mark as a registered mark, with incon-
testable status and recognition of its world-renowned reputation for skiing,
better captures the essential purposes of trademark law. 5 The dissent's
holistic approach, focusing on both the strong economic interest VA had
in its "VAIL" mark and on potential consumers of ski vacations, allowed it
to properly address the twin purposes of trademark law: protecting busi-
nesses' goodwill from misappropriation and preventing consumer confu-
sion.156 Under this practical analysis, the dissent could view the
geographically descriptive mark in its proper business and consumer con-
texts, rather than unduly focusing on one or two single factors of the
Tenth Circuit's multi-factor test.1 57 The Tenth Circuit's refusal to enforce
the geographically descriptive mark of a world-famous service provider
may erode federal trademark protection in future similar cases. 1 5 8
D. An Emerging Challenge for Likelihood of Confusion Analysis:
Trademark Infringement in Cyberspace
Not only does the Vail ruling put holders of geographically descriptive
marks on notice that their legal rights are on shaky ground, but the impact
could spill over to other industries and areas of law.15 9 One emerging
area where the Vail precedent may have an impact is in the context of
is primarily descriptive of a geographic location"). For a discussion of the doc-
trines of secondary meaning and incontestability, see supra notes 27-29 and accom-
panying text.
155. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 867 (recognizing that VA holds registered and incon-
testable mark). Protecting this type of mark in the commercial context of ski re-
sort and lodging services, even considering the mark's geographically descriptive
nature, would better fit with the underlying purposes of federal trademark law. See
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 781-82 (1992) (describing pur-
pose of Lanham Act). The Lanham Act's legislative history reinforces the appro-
priateness of such a result. See id. (discussing legislative history of Act). Senator
Lanham, the sponsor of the Trademark Act of 1946, stated, "The purpose of [the
Act] is to protect legitimate business and the consumers of the country." Id. (quot-
ing 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946) (statement of Sen. Lanham)).
156. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 884 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (arguing that "total-
ity of the factors strongly confirms that VTC's mark is likely to cause consumer
confusion"). For a discussion of the Lanham Act's legislative history that articu-
lates the twin aims of trademark protection, see supra note 22 and accompanying
text.
157. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 884 (Tymkovich, J., dissenting) (finding consumer
confusion when analyzing factors as a whole).
158. See id. at 873 (majority opinion) (declining protection of geographically
descriptive mark in ski resort context); Gold, supra note 11, at 2547 (stating that, in
light of Vail, clients using geographically descriptive marks should be advised that
"the scope of their protection will likely be very narrow, and it will be extremely
difficult to stop others from using the geographically descriptive portion of the
mark unless the use directly competes with the original mark").
159. See, e.g., David M. Klein & Daniel C. Glazer, Reconsidering Initial Interest
Confusion on the Internet, 93 TRADEMARK REP. 1035, 1035 (2003) (identifying In-
ternet as area of trademark law where consumer confusion occurs).
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websites and Internet domain names.1 60 As demonstrated by the recent
influx of trademark infringement disputes in Internet contexts, courts are
beginning to show a willingness to protect the rights of trademark holders
in online commerce. 161 For instance, the Tenth Circuit recently recog-
nized that initial interest confusion can constitute trademark infringement
on the Internet when a competitor uses another's mark to lure consumers
to its own unaffiliated website.16 2
Applying trademark law to the Internet may be controversial, given
the inherent differences between online commerce and the traditional
real-world marketplace.1 63 Nonetheless, in the commercial Internet con-
text, the chances for consumers to fall victim to initial interest confusion
from competing websites are great.16 4 The less care the consumer exer-
cises in investigating and making a purchase, the greater chance he or she
will become confused by the similar mark of a competitor.16 5 Moreover,
the ease with which Internet consumers can visit websites without much
thought can be analogized to callers of 1-800 numbers who are seeking
goods or service providers, like those in Vail 1 6 6 Other circuit courts have
recognized this similarity between domain names and vanity phone num-
160. See generally id. (discussing issues with initial interest confusion in In-
ternet context).
161. See Klein & Glazer, supra note 159, at 1039 ("Courts have widely em-
braced the initial interest confusion doctrine as well-suited to addressing the unau-
thorized use of another's trademark as a domain name for a website promoting or
offering for sale products or services."); see also Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Com-
puter Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that automobile com-
pany's trademark "Nissan" was infringed by Internet websites "Nissan.com" and
"Nissan.net" when websites offered links to other automobile-related sites).
162. SeeAustralian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1239 (10th Cir. 2006)
(explaining that "[i]nitial interest confusion in the [1Internet context derives from
the unauthorized use of trademarks to divert [I]ntemet traffic, thereby capitaliz-
ing on a trademark holder's goodwill") (citation omitted). The court held that the
defendant violated the Lanham Act by using the plaintiff competitor's marks to
improperly attract consumers' attention and drive Internet traffic to its own web-
sites. See id. (holding that using goodwill associated with plaintiffs marks to lure
consumers to defendant's website constituted trademark infringement).
163. See David J. Franklyn, Owning Words in Cyberspace: The Accidental Trademark
Regime, 2001 Wis. L. REv. 1251, 1251-55 (2001) (arguing that federal trademark
system is incompatible with Internet practice of commodifying domain names and
granting absolute exclusivity to only one person who owns specific domain name).
164. See Brookfield Commc'ns, Inc, v. W. Coast Ent. Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1057 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting that initial interest confusion is applicable to Internet
because "web surfers are more likely to be confused as to the ownership of a web-
site than traditional patrons of a brick-and-mortar store would be of a store's
ownership").
165. See Sally Beauty Co. v. Beautyco, Inc., 304 F.3d 964, 975 (10th Cir. 2002)
(noting that sophisticated consumer exercising high degree of care in purchase is
less likely to be confused).
166. See Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 857 (10th Cir. 2008)
(describing defendant's use of 1-800 number).
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bers.1 67 Even if a competing phone number or website provides a dis-
claimer stating that it is not the true source of the goods or services, the
damage might already have been done under the initial interest theory. 68
Thus, if an Internet domain name includes a geographically descriptive
mark-a class of marks with an already tenuous legal status-courts might
be even more reluctant to enforce the mark.1 69
V. CONCLUSION
Trademarks and service marks, key components in the rapidly grow-
ing field of intellectual property law, provide valuable benefits in the mar-
ketplace and accordingly should receive legal protection.1 7 0 Yet, a federal
system that overextends trademark protection beyond its economic and
social purposes can harm competition.' 7 1 Given this delicate balancing
act in trademark law, it is not surprising that federal courts have had
trouble applying these competing principles to the facts of specific
cases.1 72 If applied appropriately, though, courts can protect the geo-
graphic marks of producers that have, over time, delivered quality prod-
ucts to consumers and cultivated strong and trusted reputations. 73
While the Tenth Circuit's decision in Vail added some authoritative
clarity to the troublesome issue of geographically descriptive marks, it also
unfortunately threatens the enforceability of these marks. 174 The aspects
167. See Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 878 (6th Cir. 2002) ("[A] useful anal-
ogy exists between domain names and vanity telephone numbers.... Like domain
names, telephone numbers can be used .. . for the purpose of identification, in
which case infringement might occur . . . .") (internal citations omitted); Panavi-
sion Int'l L.P., v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1325 (9th Cir. 1998) ("A domain name
is similar to a 'vanity number' that identifies its source.").
168. See Australian Gold, Inc. v. Hatfield, 436 F.3d 1228, 1238-39 (10th Cir.
2006) (emphasizing that when consumer mistakenly visits confusingly similar do-
main name, he or she may stay with competitor and therefore mark holder has
been unfairly deprived of potential visitors or customers).
169. SeeJason K. Levine, Contesting the Incontestable: Reforming Trademark's De-
scriptive Mark Protection Scheme, 41 GONz. L. REv. 29, 63-68 (2006) (noting that abso-
lute-exclusivity nature of domain name registration poses problems especially for
descriptive marks because only owner of specific domain name will be able to ef-
fectively prove secondary meaning).
170. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 269-70 (discussing decreased con-
sumer search costs and increased incentives for producers to create quality prod-
ucts and build goodwill as economic benefits of trademark protection).
171. See Carter, supra note 4, at 760 (arguing that Lanham Act can overextend
trademark protection to detriment of consumers and prevent competitors from
entering market).
172. See Lemley, supra note 3, at 1697 (noting courts' difficulty in balancing
rights of trademark holders against social and economic costs of protection).
173. See Durham, supra note 28, at 1224 (arguing that trademark law has "too
much ignored the powerful symbolic uses of geography in marketing goods and
services" and instead should protect mark holder's "opportunity to enhance the
allure of the product by associating it . . . with a meaningful place").
174. See Sherwinter, supra note 135, at 49 (arguing that Vail decision could
affect legal protection of geographically descriptive marks in future).
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of the Vail majority's reasoning that characterize the ski resort's efforts to
protect its mark as anticompetitive draw from the "trademark monopoly"
theory, which aims to significantly limit the reach of federal trademark
protection and is detrimental to valid, protectable marks.17 5 If future
courts consistently apply this general rationale, the legal enforceability of
otherwise valid and strong marks may be in jeopardy.' 7 6
The Vail decision's lasting impact may be the Tenth Circuit's princi-
pled denial of the strength of a world-famous geographic mark.' 7 7 Yet
enforcing these marks, when appropriate, would not stifle competition.17 8
Instead, it would reward producers for creating quality products associated
with a geographic place and prevent confusion among consumers seeking
those products.17 9 These economic and social benefits are deserving of
legal protection, not nebulous and uncertain positions in federal trade-
mark law.
John E. Jennings III
175. See Vail Assocs. v. Vend-Tel-Co., 516 F.3d 853, 873 (10th Cir. 2008) (as-
serting that some confusion to consumers caused by VTC's phone number will be
tolerated because it is undesirable to "allow anyone to obtain a complete monop-
oly on use of a descriptive term simply by grabbing it first"). Proponents of the
trademark monopoly theory argue that the current federal system of protection
unreasonably gives marks legal rights analogous to real property rights. See Glynn
S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY L.J. 367, 367 (1999) (discussing
viewpoint that "trademark protection can effectively cede control over distinct
product markets to individual producers and thereby generate for trademark own-
ers the downward sloping demand curve of a monopolist"). But see Frank H. Eas-
terbrook, Intellectual Property Is Still Property, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 108, 118
(1990) ("Rights to exclude are not monopolies just because the property involved
is an intangible rather than something you can walk across or hold in your
hand."). Specifically, trademark monopoly theory explains that a "property-based"
trademark system is harmful to competition by creating higher prices, deadweight
losses, and inefficiently allocating resources. See Lunney, Jr., supra, at 371-72 (dis-
cussing issues with "property-based" trademark system). Further, under this the-
ory, preventing consumer deception and confusion are not realistic justifications
for strong trademark protection. See id. at 478-87 (explaining how trademark mo-
nopoly theory applies to federal law).
176. See Gold, supra note 11, at 2547 (stating that, in light of Vail, clients using
geographically descriptive marks should be advised that "the scope of their protec-
tion will likely be very narrow, and it will be extremely difficult to stop others from
using the geographically descriptive portion of the mark unless the use directly
competes with the original mark").
177. See Vail, 516 F.3d at 873 (explaining that court will not "extend unwar-
ranted service mark protection to VA on what the record tells us is first and fore-
most a geographical term describing a ski destination in the Colorado Rockies").
178. See Landes & Posner, supra note 4, at 269-70 (arguing in favor of strong
protection for trademarks).
179. See id. (arguing that strong protection of marks allows holders to garner
goodwill with consuming public and creates incentives for delivering quality goods
and services).
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